Jan 2002
January 2002 and After: CIA Given Control of Al-Libi, Renders Him to Egypt At the request of CIA Director George Tenet, the White House orders the FBI to hand Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a captured al-Qaeda operative being held in Afghanistan (see December 19, 2001), over to the CIA. One day before the transfer, a CIA officer enters al-Libi’s cell, interrupting an interrogation being conducted by FBI agent Russel Fincher, and tells al-Libi: “You’re going to Cairo, you know. Before you get there I’m going to find your mother and I’m going to f_ck her.” Soon after, al-Libi is flown to Egypt. 6/21/2004; WASHINGTON POST, 6/27/2004; ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 121 Vincent Cannistraro, former head of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, will later say: “He’s carried off to Egypt, who torture him. And we know that he’s going to be tortured. Anyone who’s worked on Egypt, has worked on other countries in the Middle East, knows that. Egyptians torture him, and he provides a lot of information.” FRONTLINE, 6/20/2006 Provides Mix of Valid, False Information - It is unclear whether al-Libi is interrogated solely by Egyptian officials, or by a combination of Egyptian and CIA interrogators. Al-Libi is subjected to a series of increasingly harsh techniques, including at least one, waterboarding, that is considered torture (see Mid-March 2002). Reputedly, he is finally broken after being waterboarded and then forced to stand naked in a cold cell overnight where he is repeatedly doused with cold water by his captors. Al-Libi is said to provide his Egyptian interrogators with valuable intelligence about an alleged plot to blow up the US Embassy in Yemen with a truck bomb, and the location of Abu Zubaida, who will be captured in March 2002 (see Mid-May 2002 and After). However, in order to avoid harsh treatment he will also provide false information to the Egyptians, alleging that Iraq trained al-Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and gases. Officials will later determine that al-Libi has no knowledge of such training or weapons, and fabricates the statements out of fear and a desire to avoid further torture. Sources will later confirm that al-Libi did not try to deliberately mislead his captors; rather, he told them what he thought they wanted to hear. NEWS, 11/18/2005; NEW YORK TIMES, 12/9/2005 Using Allegations in White House Statements - Both President Bush (see October 7, 2002) and Secretary of State Colin Powell (see February 5, 2003) will include these allegations in major speeches. Shifting Responsibility for Interrogations to CIA from FBI - The FBI has thus far taken the lead in interrogations of terrorist suspects, because its agents are the ones with most experience. The CIA’s apparent success with al-Libi contributes to the shift of interrogations from the bureau to the CIA. POST, 6/27/2004 Such methods as making death threats, advocated by the CIA, are opposed by the FBI, which is used to limiting its questioning techniques so the results from interrogations can be used in court. POST, 6/27/2004 “We don’t believe in coercion,” a senior FBI official says. 9/13/2004 Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, Russell Fincher, Vincent Cannistraro Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links Early January 2002: Some Top Taliban Leaders Surrender Then Are Released Mullah Obaidullah Akhund. Public domain Seven former Taliban leaders surrender to the Northern Alliance near Kandahar, Afghanistan, but are released. Two are on a US list of twelve most wanted Taliban leaders: Defense Minister Mullah Obaidullah Akhund and Justice Minister Mullah Nooruddin Turabi. Akhund “is considered by American intelligence officials to have been one of the Taliban leaders closest to Mr. bin Laden.” The US military denies reports of their release, but officials of the new Afghan government confirm the account and are unrepentant about it. They claim they are following through on an announced policy to grant amnesty to any Taliban leaders who surrender. CNN reports, “Though US forces expressed interest in the men,… they accepted the Afghan decision to let them go, and have given no indication they are pursuing them…” This follows other accounts of Taliban leaders being released in December 2001 (see December 24, 2001). A senior Pakistani official will later note, “Unbelievably, not one cabinet minister was killed, arrested, or defected to opposition forces during the two-month-long, nonstop bombing.” It appears that the highest ranking Taliban leader to have been killed or captured is the deputy foreign minister, who was killed in a bombing raid. POST, 12/17/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 12/20/2001; WASHINGTON POST, 1/10/2002; CNN, 1/10/2002 Mullah Obaidullah Akhund will later become one of the most important leaders of the continued Taliban resistance. In 2004, it will be reported that Pakistan is allowing him and other Taliban leaders to freely come and go through Pakistan (see August 18, 2005). GLOBE, 7/11/2004 Entity Tags: Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, Mullah Nooruddin Turabi Category Tags: Afghanistan, Escape From Afghanistan, Key Captures and Deaths January 1, 2002: Ex-Unocal Employee Becomes US Special Envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad, already Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Gulf, Southwest Asia and Other Regional Issues, and a prominent neoconversative (see May 23, 2001), is appointed by Bush as a special envoy to Afghanistan. 1/1/2002 In his former role as Unocal adviser, Khalilzad participated in negotiations with the Taliban to build a pipeline through Afghanistan. He also wrote op-eds in the Washington Post in 1997 (see October 7, 1996) supporting the Taliban regime, back when Unocal was hoping to work with the Taliban. 1/10/2002 He will be appointed US ambassador to Afghanistan in 2003 (see November 2003). Entity Tags: Unocal, Hamid Karzai, Taliban, Zalmay M. Khalilzad Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Pipeline Politics, Afghanistan Early January-January 9, 2002: Indonesia Arrests Suspected Al-Qaeda Operative at CIA’s Request, Extradites Him to Egypt Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni. Public domain The CIA sends a request to Indonesia to arrest suspected 24-year old al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni and extradite him to Egypt. The CIA found his name in al-Qaeda documents obtained in Afghanistan. The agency believes that Iqbal, a Pakistani, worked with Richard Reid (see December 22, 2001), the Briton charged with attempting to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami on December 22 with explosives in his shoes. A few days later, the Egyptian government sends Jakarta a formal request to extradite Madni in connection with terrorism, providing Indonesian authorities with a convenient cover for complying with the CIA request. On January 9, Iqbal is detained in Jakarta by Indonesia’s State Intelligence Agency at the insistence of the CIA. He is flown to Egypt two days later (see January 11, 2002). POST, 3/11/2002 Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, 2001 Attempted Shoe Bombing 2002-March 10, 2004: ’Emir’ of Madrid Bombings Is Surrounded by Informants Allekema Lamari, one of about three of the 2004 Madrid train bombing masterminds, is released from a Spanish prison in 2002. The Spanish government will later call him the “emir” of the bombings. Most of the alleged Madrid bombers have little formal connection to any Islamist militant group or training camp, but Lamari has an extensive background as an Algerian militant. He was imprisoned in Spain in 1997 for belonging to the GIA militant group. When he is released from prison in 2002, an informant named Safwan Sabagh closely follows him. Sabagh travels with him, and moves towns at the same time Lamari does. Sabagh has a special assignment from the Spanish intelligence agency, the CNI, to focus on Lamari, since Lamari is considered such a dangerous character. Sabagh is considered an excellent informant and gives a steady stream of information about Lamari. For instance, on March 8, just three days before the Madrid bombings, Lamari calls Sabagh and appears nervous and concerned about something that has to happen soon. Sabagh is with Lamari when Lamari meets other masterminds of the plot, such as Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet. Sabagh also introduces Lamari to Mohamed Afalah and vouches that he is a person Lamari can trust. MUNDO (MADRID), 10/17/2005 Afalah becomes Lamari’s driver, bodyguard, and confidante, but Afalah also is an informant for the CNI. MUNDO (MADRID), 1/15/2007 Furthermore, three other CNI informants, Abdelkader Farssaoui (alias Cartagena), Smail Latrech, and Rabia Gaya, also sometimes keep tabs on Lamari. Several weeks after the Madrid bombings, Sabagh will be arrested and held for one day, and then let go. It has not been explained how the CNI is unable to stop the Madrid bombings when possibly the most important mastermind of those bombings was surrounded by so many informants. MUNDO (MADRID), 10/17/2005 Entity Tags: Groupe Islamique Armé, Abdelkader Farssaoui, Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, Smail Latrech, Safwan Sabagh, Rabia Gaya, Allekema Lamari, Mohamed Afalah, Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet Category Tags: Other Possible Moles or Informants, Al-Qaeda in Spain, 2004 Madrid Train Bombings January 4, 2002: US Doctors Information About Al-Qaeda Militants Defense Department pamplet with a badly doctored photo of bin Laden. Note the blurry area around his neck. US Defense Department It is reported that the State Department said Mohamed Atta “wanted to learn to fly, but didn’t need to take off and land” when this information clearly refers to Zacarias Moussaoui (although that story isn’t exactly true for him either (see August 13-15, 2001)). It is also reported that the military dropped leaflets in Afghanistan which featured photos depicting bin Laden in Western clothing, with his hair cut short and beard shaved off. An expert says “Frankly, this is sloppy,” and the article calls these propaganda efforts “worthy of the tabloids.” PRESS, 1/4/2002 Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Mohamed Atta, US Department of Defense, US Department of State Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 January 4, 2002: Firefighter Magazine Scolds WTC Investigation A firefighter trade magazine with ties to the New York Fire Department calls the investigation into the collapse of the WTC a “half-baked farce.” The article points out that the probe has not looked at all aspects of the disaster and has had limited access to documents and other evidence. “The destruction and removal of evidence must stop immediately.” The writer, Bill Manning, states, “I have combed through our national standard for fire investigation, NFPA 921, but nowhere in it does one find an exemption allowing the destruction of evidence for buildings over 10 stories tall.” He concludes that a growing number of fire protection engineers have theorized that “the structural damage from the planes and the explosive ignition of jet fuel in themselves were not enough to bring down the towers.” Yet, “as things now stand and if they continue in such fashion, the investigation into the World Trade Center fire and collapse will amount to paper- and computer-generated hypotheticals.” ENGINEERING, 1/2002; NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 1/4/2002 Entity Tags: New York City Fire Department, World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: WTC Investigation January 5, 2002: FBI Interested in Captured Pakistani Militant Leader The FBI has asked Pakistan for permission to question Maulana Masood Azhar, the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed, according to reports. Pakistan arrested him on December 25, 2001, after US pressure to do so. One Pakistani official says, “The Americans are aware Azhar met bin Laden often, and are convinced he can give important information about bin Laden’s present whereabouts and even the September 11 attacks.” But the “primary reason” for US interest is the link between Azhar and Saeed Sheikh. They hope to learn about Saeed’s involvement in financing the 9/11 attacks. Whether Pakistan gives permission to question Azhar is unclear. Four days later, the US officially asks Pakistan for help in finding and extraditing Saeed. NEWS, 1/5/2002 Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Saeed Sheikh, Osama bin Laden, Pakistan, Maulana Masood Azhar Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh January 6, 2002: Mullah Omar Escapes Capture by US Military Mullah Mohammed Omar. CBC The US allegedly locates former Taliban leader Mullah Omar and 1,500 of his soldiers in the remote village of Baghran, Afghanistan. After a six-day siege, and surrounded by US helicopters and troops, Omar and four bodyguards supposedly escape the dragnet in a daring chase on motorcycles over dirt roads. His soldiers are set free in return for giving up their weapons, in a deal brokered by local leaders. Yet it remains unclear if Omar was ever in the village in the first place. 1/6/2002 Entity Tags: Taliban, Mullah Omar Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Afghanistan, Escape From Afghanistan January 6, 2002: Shoe Bomber Is Believed to Be Involved with Pakistani Jihadists Ali Gilani. CNN The Boston Globe reports that shoe bomber Richard Reid may have had ties with an obscure Pakistani group called Al-Fuqra. Reid apparently visited the Lahore, Pakistan, home of Ali Gilani, the leader of Al-Fuqra. GLOBE, 1/6/2002 Reporter Daniel Pearl reads the article and decides to investigate. FAIR, 8/2002 Pearl believes he is on his way to interview Gilani when he is kidnapped. TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 3/3/2002 A 1995 State Department report said Al-Fuqra’s main goal is “purifying Islam through violence.” FAIR, 8/2002 Intelligence experts now say Al-Fuqra is a splinter group of Jaish-e-Mohammed, with ties to al-Qaeda. PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 1/29/2002 Al-Fuqra claims close ties with the Muslims of the Americas, a US tax-exempt group claiming about 3,000 members living in rural compounds in 19 states, the Caribbean, and Europe. Members of Al-Fuqra are suspected of at least 13 fire bombings and 17 murders, as well as theft and credit-card fraud. Gilani, who had links to people involved in the 1993 WTC bombing, fled the US after the bombing. He admitted he works with the ISI, and now lives freely in Pakistan. GLOBE, 1/6/2002; NEWS (ISLAMABAD), 2/15/2002; PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 3/3/2002; VANITY FAIR, 8/2002 Saeed Sheikh “has long had close contacts” with the group, and praises Gilani for his “unexplained services to Pakistan and Islam.” (ISLAMABAD), 2/18/2002; PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 3/3/2002 Entity Tags: Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Al-Fuqra, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Daniel Pearl, Ali Gilani, Saeed Sheikh, Richard C. Reid, Al-Qaeda Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, 2001 Attempted Shoe Bombing January 8, 2002: Intensive Search for Bin Laden and Mullah Omar in Afghanistan Comes to a Halt Military spokesperson Navy Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem says, “We’re going to stop chasing… the shadows of where we thought Laden and Mullah Omar were and focus more on the entire picture of the country, where these pockets of resistance are, what do the anti-Taliban forces need, so that we can develop a better intelligence picture. The job is not complete and those leaders whom we wish to have from the al-Qaeda and Taliban chain of command, we are casting a wide net—a worldwide net, as well as regional, for where they are.” This announcement comes just two days after reports that Mullah Omar escaped an encirclement near Kandahar and fled into the nearby hills (see January 6, 2002). 1/8/2002 Entity Tags: Abu Nidal, Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan Category Tags: Afghanistan, Escape From Afghanistan January 9, 2002: Yoo Memo Says US Not Bound by International Laws in War on Terror John Yoo, a neoconservative lawyer in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel serving as deputy assistant attorney general, writes a classified memo to senior Pentagon counsel William J. Haynes, titled “Application of Treaties and Law to al-Qaeda and Taliban Detainees.” YORK TIMES, 5/21/2004 Yoo: Geneva Conventions Do Not Apply in War on Terror - Yoo’s memo, written in conjunction with fellow Justice Department lawyer Robert Delahunty, echoes arguments by another Justice Department lawyer, Patrick Philbin, two months earlier (see November 6, 2001). Yoo states that, in his view, the laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions, do not apply to captured Taliban or al-Qaeda prisoners, nor do they apply to the military commissions set up to try such prisoners. Geneva Superseded by Presidential Authority - Yoo’s memo goes even farther, arguing that no international laws apply to the US whatsoever, because they do not have any status under US federal law. “As a result,” Yoo and Delahunty write, “any customary international law of armed conflict in no way binds, as a legal matter, the president or the US armed forces concerning the detention or trial of members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.” In essence, Yoo and Delahunty argue that President Bush and the US military have carte blanche to conduct the global war on terrorism in any manner they see fit, without the restrictions of law or treaty. However, the memo says that while the US need not follow the rules of war, it can and should prosecute al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees for violating those same laws—a legal double standard that provokes sharp criticism when the memo comes to light in May 2004 (see May 21, 2004). Yoo and Delahunty write that while this double standard may seem “at first glance, counter-intuitive,” such expansive legal powers are a product of the president’s constitutional authority “to prosecute the war effectively.” The memo continues, “Restricting the president’s plenary power over military operations (including the treatment of prisoners)” would be “constitutionally dubious.” JONES, 1/9/2002; US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 6/9/2002 ; NEWSWEEK, 5/21/2004; NEW YORK TIMES, 5/21/2004 Overriding International Legal Concerns - Yoo warns in the memo that international law experts may not accept his reasoning, as there is no legal precedent giving any country the right to unilaterally ignore its commitment to Geneva or any other such treaty, but Yoo writes that Bush, by invoking “the president’s commander in chief and chief executive powers to prosecute the war effectively,” can simply override any objections. “Importing customary international law notions concerning armed conflict would represent a direct infringement on the president’s discretion as commander in chief and chief executive to determine how best to conduct the nation’s military affairs.” 2007, PP. 146 The essence of Yoo’s argument, a Bush official later says, is that the law “applies to them, but it doesn’t apply to us.” 5/21/2004 Navy general counsel Alberto Mora later says of the memo that it “espoused an extreme and virtually unlimited theory of the extent of the president’s commander-in-chief authority.” 2007, PP. 181 White House Approval - White House counsel and future Attorney General Alberto Gonzales agrees (see January 25, 2002), saying, “In my judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions.” JONES, 1/9/2002 Spark for Prisoner Abuses - Many observers believe that Yoo’s memo is the spark for the torture and prisoner abuses later reported from Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison (see Evening November 7, 2003), Guantanamo Bay (see December 28, 2001), and other clandestine prisoner detention centers (see March 2, 2007). The rationale is that since Afghanistan is what Yoo considers a “failed state,” with no recognizable sovereignity, its militias do not have any status under any international treaties. 5/21/2004; NEWSWEEK, 5/24/2004 Resistance from Inside, Outside Government - Within days, the State Department will vehemently protest the memo, but to no practical effect (see January 25, 2002). Entity Tags: Patrick F. Philbin, Robert J. Delahunty, US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Taliban, John C. Yoo, Colin Powell, Geneva Conventions, Al-Qaeda, George W. Bush, Alberto Mora, US Department of State, Alberto R. Gonzales, William J. Haynes Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics January 11, 2002: First Prisoners Transferred to Guantanamo Bay An aerial shot of Camp X-Ray. Public domain The US prison camp at Guantanamo receives its first 20 prisoners from the Afghan battlefield. 1/11/2002 The prisoners are flown on a C-141 Starlifter cargo plane, escorted during the final leg of the journey by a Navy assault helicopter and a naval patrol boat. The prisoners, hooded, shackled, wearing blackout goggles and orange jumpsuits, and possibly drugged, are escorted one by one off the plane by scores of Marines in full battle gear. They are interred in what reporter Charlie Savage will later call “kennel-like outdoor cages” in the makeshift containment facility dubbed Camp X-Ray. 1/11/2002; SAVAGE, 2007, PP. 142-143 Leaked Photos of Transfer Cause International Outcry - Pictures of prisoners being transferred in conditions clearly in violation of international law are later leaked, prompting an outcry. But rather than investigating the inhumane transfer, the Pentagon will begin investigating how the pictures were leaked. PRESS, 11/9/2002 Guantanamo Chosen to Keep Prisoners out of US Jurisdiction - The prisoners are sent to this base—leased by Cuba to the US—because it is on foreign territory and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of US law (see December 28, 2001). AND MAIL, 9/5/2002 It was once a coaling station used by the US Navy, and in recent years had been used by Coast Guard helicopters searching for drug runners and refugees trying to make it across the Florida Straits to US soil. In 1998, the Clinton administration had briefly considered and then rejected a plan to bring some prisoners from Kosovo to Guantanamo. Guantanamo was chosen as an interim prison for Afghanis who survived the uprising at Mazar-e Sharif prison (see 11:25 a.m. November 25, 2001) by an interagency working group (see Shortly Before September 23, 2001), who considered and rejected facilities in Germany and other European countries. Group leader Pierre-Richard Prosper will later recall: “We looked at our military bases in Europe and ruled that out because (a), we’d have to get approval from a European government, and (b), we’d have to deal with the European Court of Human Rights and we didn’t know how they’d react. We didn’t want to lose control over it and have it become a European process because it was on European soil. And so we kept looking around and around, and basically someone said, ‘What about Guantanamo?’” The base may well have not been the final choice of Prosper’s group; it was still researching a Clinton-era attempt to house Haitian and Cuban refugees there that had been challenged in court when Rumsfeld unilaterally made the decision to begin transferring prisoners to the naval base. 2007, PP. 143-144 No Geneva Convention Strictures Apply to 'Unlawful Combatants' - Rumsfeld, acting on the advice of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, publicly declares the detainees “unlawful combatants” and thereby not entitled to the rights of the Geneva Conventions. “Unlawful combatants do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention,” Rumsfeld says. Though, according to Rumsfeld, the government will “for the most part treat them in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the Geneva Conventions, to the extent they are appropriate.” 1/11/2002 There is no reason to feel sorry for these detainees, says Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He states, “These are people who would gnaw through hydraulic lines at the back of a C-17 to bring it down.” YORK TIMES, 6/21/2004 British Officials: 'Scandalous' - Senior British officials privately call the treatment of prisoners “scandalous,” and one calls the refusal to follow the Geneva Convention “not benchmarks of a civilized society.” 6/13/2002 Entity Tags: US Department of the Navy, United States, US Department of Defense, Pierre-Richard Prosper, Richard B. Myers, Clinton administration, Donald Rumsfeld, Charlie Savage, Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Office of Legal Counsel, Geneva Conventions Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics January 11-16, 2002: 9/11 Suspect Freed after Proof Emerges of His Innocence Egyptian national Abdallah Higazy (see December 17, 2001), who has falsely confessed to owning a transceiver that may connect him to the 9/11 plot in order to save his family from being tortured (see December 27, 2001), is charged with making false statements connected to the 9/11 attacks. Higazy has given three different versions of how he obtained the radio; the FBI is sure he is lying about not being complicit in the plot. Three days after Higazy is charged, an airline pilot from Ohio claims the suspect transceiver as his own, and unknowingly vindicates Higazy. Higazy is released two days later, and a hotel security guard is eventually charged with lying to the FBI about the location of the radio. Higazy’s lawyer, Jonathan Abady, later says: “What if that pilot had not walked into the Millennium Hotel? We know that Mr. Higazy could have spent the rest of his life in prison.” In 2007, Higazy will say that he chose to confess to the ownership of the suspect transceiver because he knew the FBI could have his family turned over to Egyptian intelligence agents for torture. “I knew I couldn’t prove my innocence, and I knew my family was in danger,” he will recall. “If I say this device is mine, I’m screwed and my family is going to be safe. If I say this device is not mine, I’m screwed and my family’s in danger. And FBI Agent Michael Templeton made it quite clear that ‘cooperate’ had to mean saying something else other than this device is not mine.” Higazy’s subsequent lawsuit against the hotel (prompted by a hotel employee lying to the FBI about him) will eventually be settled out of court; his suit against the FBI will still be pending in October 2007 (see October 18, 2007). POST, 10/25/2007 Entity Tags: Michael Templeton, Abdallah Higazy, Jonathan Abady, Federal Bureau of Investigation Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation January 12, 2002: Pakistani President Musharraf Denounces Terrorism, but Quickly Returns to Supporting Violent Militants Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf makes “a forceful speech… condemning Islamic extremism.” POST, 3/28/2002 He is essentially forced to make the speech in response to intense international pressure, as incursions by Islamist militants backed by Pakistan into the disputed region of Kashmir have brought Pakistan and India to the brink of nuclear war. For instance, on January 6, President Bush says publicly, “I think it’s very important for President Musharraf to make a clear statement to the world that he intends to crack down on terror. And I believe if he does that… it’ll provide relief… on a situation that’s still serious.” The US even gives Musharraf a list of points to cover in the speech, and he says everything the US wants him to say. In the speech, Musharraf says: “Pakistan has been made a soft state where the supremacy of law is questioned. This situation cannot be tolerated any longer.… Pakistan rejects and condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity anywhere in the world.… No organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir.” He specifically denounces violent jihad for the first time. However, he does not renounce Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir, saying, “Kashmir runs in our blood.” He announces a ban on five militant groups, and more than a thousand militants are arrested after the speech. The speech does cool tensions with India temporarily. But within several months it is clear that the attacks in Kashmir are continuing and most of the arrested militants have been released (see Shortly After January 12-March 2002). Pakistan and India come close to nuclear war again by May 2002. 2008, PP. 116-118, 146 Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, George W. Bush Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI Shortly After January 12-March 2002: Facing International Pressure, Pakistan Arrests 3,000 Militants, Then Quietly Releases Them On January 12, 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf gives a speech denouncing violent Islamist militancy for the first time. He is essentially forced to give the speech after militants supported by Pakistan launched attacks in the disputed region of Kashmir, bringing India and Pakistan close to the brink of nuclear war. He also bans five militant groups (see January 12, 2002). 2008, PP. 116-118 Shortly after the speech, Pakistan arrests about 3,000 suspected militants. Musharraf is hailed in the Western media as redirecting the ISI to support the US agenda. But by the end of the month, at least 800 of the arrested are set free, including most of their leaders. Not a single one of the arrested militants is charged with any terrorist offense. POST, 3/28/2002; TIME, 5/6/2002; RASHID, 2008, PP. 155 A US diplomat based in Pakistan will later say: “By March it was clear to us that Musharraf was not going to implement his promises in the speech. All the arrested militants were freed, and the military had no intention of imposing any curbs on their activities.” The US State Department attempts to pressure Musharraf to keep the promises he made in the speech. However, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the US Defense Department is reluctant to pressure him, fearing that Pakistan will stop cooperating in capturing al-Qaeda leaders. Rumsfeld is apparently not concerned by the strong links between Pakistani militant groups and al-Qaeda. 2008, PP. 118 Within one year, “almost all” of those arrested have been quietly released. Even the most prominent leaders, such as Maulana Masood Azhar, have been released. Their banned militant organizations are running again, most under new names. POST, 2/8/2003 Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Ahmed Rashid, Pervez Musharraf, Maulana Masood Azhar, US Department of State, US Department of Defense, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics January 13, 2002: Former German Minister Believes CIA Is Responsible for 9/11 Andreas von Buelow. Public domain Andreas von Bülow, former German Minister for Research and Technology and a long-time member of German parliament, suggests in an interview that the CIA could have been behind the 9/11 attacks. He states: “Whoever wants to understand the CIA’s methods, has to deal with its main task of covert operations: Below the level of war, and outside international law, foreign states are to be influenced by inciting insurrections or terrorist attacks, usually combined with drugs and weapons trade, and money laundering.… Since, however, it must not under any circumstances come out that there is an intelligence agency behind it, all traces are erased, with tremendous deployment of resources. I have the impression that this kind of intelligence agency spends 90 percent of its time this way: creating false leads. So that if anyone suspects the collaboration of the agencies, he is accused of paranoia. The truth often comes out only years later.” TAGESSPIEGEL (BERLIN), 1/13/2002 In an example of covering tracks, Ephraim Halevy, head of Israel’s Mossad from 1998 until 2002, claims, “Not one big success of the Mossad has ever been made public” (see February 5, 2003). NEWS, 2/5/2003 Entity Tags: Andreas von Bulow, Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad), Central Intelligence Agency, Ephraim Halevy Timeline Tags: Alleged Use of False Flag Attacks, 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism January 14, 2002: FBI Special Agent Concerned That Translator Is Protecting Surveillance Targets and Involved in Espionage Dennis Saccher, the FBI’s special agent in charge of Turkish counter-intelligence, invites FBI translator Sibel Edmonds into his office and shares with her his concern that Edmonds’ co-worker, Melek Can Dickerson, is protecting surveillance targets at the American-Turkish Council (ATC). He shows her several translations of wiretapped conversations that Dickerson either marked as “not pertinent,” or for which she provided only a brief summary indicating that the conversations were not important. When Edmonds tells Saccher that her department, at the request of Dickerson, no longer assigns translation tasks randomly and that certain targets, including the ATC, have been permanently attached to Dickerson, Saccher is shocked. “It sounds like espionage to me,” he suggests. At Saccher’s request, Edmonds and Kevin Taskasen, another translator, re-translate some of the conversations Dickerson had marked as “not pertinent.” They agree to schedule a meeting with supervisor Mike Feghali on February 1 (see February 1, 2002). POST, 6/19/2002; VANITY FAIR, 9/2005 Entity Tags: Melek Can Dickerson, American-Turkish Council, Kevin Taskasen, Sibel Edmonds, Dennis Saccher Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds Between January 14, 2002 and February 1, 2002: FBI Translator Re-Translates Wiretaps Assigned to Colleague; Discovers Colleague Buried Critical Information FBI contract linguist Sibel Edmonds re-translates 17 of the “hundreds” of wiretapped conversations that had been originally translated or reviewed by co-worker Melek Can Dickerson. (.COM), 8/15/2005 She discovers that Dickerson marked as “not pertinent” every single file that included a reference to surveillance targets connected to the Turkish organizations with whom she had ties (see (November 2001)). One of those targets is a Turkish intelligence officer, who is a personal friend of Dickerson. Edmonds learns from the wiretaps that the officer had spies inside the US State Department and Pentagon seeking access to US military and intelligence secrets. 10/27/2002 The wiretaps also reveal that the group is involved in arms and drug smuggling and is tied into a complex network of governmental and private figures in several countries. PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 11/15/2005 Additionally, Edmonds identifies hundreds of other instances where Dickerson’s work obstructed investigations. For example, she learns from one conversation that a US State Department staffer agreed to accept $7,000 in cash from certain individuals in the American-Turkish Council (ATC) in exchange for information. One wiretapped call discussed a payment to a Pentagon official, who seemed to be involved in weapons-procurement negotiations, while another suggested that Turkish doctoral students had been placed at US research institutions in order to obtain information about black market nuclear weapons. Edmonds also hears discussions about the laundering of drug smuggling profits, the selling of classified military technologies, and a scheme to secretly give Republican Congressman Dennis Hastert tens of thousands of dollars in exchange for political favors and information. She becomes convinced that the American-Turkish Council (ATC) is being used as a front for criminal activity. (.COM), 7/1/2004; ANTI-WAR (.COM), 8/15/2005; VANITY FAIR, 9/2005 Entity Tags: Dennis Hastert, Melek Can Dickerson, American-Turkish Council, Sibel Edmonds, US Department of State Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds January 14, 2002-2005: Secret CIA Flights to Guantanamo Cross Airspace of European Countries Prisoners being flown to Guantanamo. Public domain Beginning in January 2002, when the US-controlled Guantanamo prison opens in Cuba, until at least 2005, over 700 suspects are secretly flown by the CIA to Guantanamo over the territories of European countries. Most prisoners come from Afghanistan or other places in the Middle East and change planes at the Incirlik US military airbase in Turkey. Then they fly over Greek, Italian, and Portuguese airspace. About 170 other prisoners fly over or land in Spain. The first flight apparently takes place on January 14, and carries three British citizens known as the “Tipton Three” as well as others (see January 13, 2002). In 2007, the Council of Europe, Europe’s leading watchdog on human rights, will claim that European countries had breached the international Convention against Torture (see October 21, 1994) by giving the US secret permission to use its airspace. Moazzam Begg, a British prisoner at Guantanamo until 2005, will later recall his flight to Guantanamo. “Inside the plane there was a chain around our waist, and it connected to cuffs around my wrists, which were tied in the back, and to my ankles. We were seated but it was so painful not being able to speak, to hear, to breathe properly, to look, to turn left or right, to move your hands, stretch your legs, or anything.” TIMES, 11/25/2007 All the member countries of NATO signed a secret agreement in late 2001 allowing blanket overflight clearances for any flight relating to terrorism (see October 4, 2001). Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Moazzam Begg Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics Before Mid-January 2002: Top CIA Official Reportedly Describes 9/11 as ‘Triumph’ According to former CIA officer Robert Baer, a high-ranking CIA official tells a reporter off-the-record that, “when the dust finally clears, Americans will see that September 11 was a triumph for the intelligence community, not a failure.” It is unclear why the CIA officer thinks this and the reporter who tells Baer this story is not named. However, Baer comments that if that is what the CIA thinks, “I’m scared to death of what lies ahead.” 2002, PP. XXIII Entity Tags: Robert Baer, Central Intelligence Agency Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Denials, US Government and 9/11 Criticism January 17, 2002: Suicide Attack Alert Issued Attorney General John Ashcroft warns that suicide attacks “might be expected because of confidential information” the US government has received. He further warns, in regards to the five most wanted terrorists, that “These men could be anywhere in the world” and “may be trained and prepared to commit future suicide terrorist acts.” 1/17/2002 Entity Tags: John Ashcroft Category Tags: Terror Alerts, Internal US Security After 9/11 January 18, 2002: Pakistani President Says Bin Laden Probably Dead Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf says that he thinks Osama bin Laden is most likely dead because he has been unable to get treatment for his kidney disease. “I think now, frankly, he is dead for the reason he is a… kidney patient,” says Musharraf in an interview with CNN. According to Musharraf, Pakistan knows bin Laden took two dialysis machines into Afghanistan, and, “One was specifically for his own personal use.” Musharraf adds: “I don’t know if he has been getting all that treatment in Afghanistan now. And the photographs that have been shown of him on television show him extremely weak.… I would give the first priority that he is dead and the second priority that he is alive somewhere in Afghanistan.” However, some US officials are skeptical of this. One senior Bush administration official says Musharraf reached a “reasonable conclusion,” but warns it is only a guess. “We don’t have remains or evidence of his death. So it is a decent and reasonable conclusion—a good guess but it is a guess,” says the official. He adds that US intelligence indicates bin Laden needs dialysis every three days and, “it is fairly obvious that that could be an issue when you are running from place to place, and facing the idea of needing to generate electricity in a mountain hideout.” However, another US official contradicts the reports of bin Laden’s health problems, saying there is “no evidence” the suspected terrorist mastermind has ever suffered kidney failure or required kidney dialysis. The official calls such suggestions a “recurrent rumor.” 1/18/2002 Entity Tags: Bush administration, Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, Pervez Musharraf Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden January 20, 2002- March 20, 2002: Al-Qaeda Leader Who Worked with British Intelligence Probably Secretly Captured and Sent to Egypt In January 2002, the Observer reports that Anas al-Liby, one of al-Qaeda’s top leaders, has been recently captured in Afghanistan. Al-Liby is considered one of bin Laden’s computer experts, and a long-time member of al-Qaeda’s ruling council. 1/20/2002 In early March 2002, the London Times mentions al-Liby’s capture as an established fact. TIMES, 3/11/2002 Then, in late March 2002, the London Times and the Washington Post report that al-Liby has been recently captured in Sudan. Anonymous CIA sources and anonymous “senior administration officials” claim that al-Liby has been captured, but the Sudanese and US governments officially deny the arrest. The London Times says the arrest “has been kept a closely guarded secret.” Some senior officials who told the Post al-Liby had been arrested later change their account and say it was someone with a similar name. TIMES, 3/17/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 3/19/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 3/20/2002 Al-Liby remains on the FBI’s most wanted list, with a $25 million reward on his name. TIMES, 5/8/2005 Al-Liby appears to have collaborated with British intelligence to kill Libyan leader Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi in 1996 and was allowed to openly live in Britain until 2000 (see 1995-May 2000; 1996). In 2003, it will be reported that al-Liby was captured in Sudan and then secretly deported to Egypt, where he is wanted for an attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (see (Late 1995)). ON SUNDAY, 10/26/2003 In 2007, human rights groups will list al-Liby as a possible ghost prisoner still held by the US (see June 7, 2007). Entity Tags: Anas al-Liby Category Tags: Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism, Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 January 22, 2002: Saeed Sheikh and ISI Stage Attack in India A crowd of mostly unarmed Indian police near the US Information Service building in Calcutta, India, is attacked by gunmen; four policemen are killed and 21 people injured. The gunmen escape. India claims that Aftab Ansari immediately calls to take credit, and India charges that the gunmen belong to Ansari’s kidnapping ring are also connected to funding the 9/11 attacks in August 2001 (see Early August 2001). TELEGRAPH, 1/24/2002; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 2/10/2002 Saeed Sheikh and the ISI assist Ansari in the attack. TRIBUNE-REVIEW, 3/3/2002; VANITY FAIR, 8/2002 This is the fourth attack in which they have cooperated, including the 9/11 attacks, and attacks in October and December 2001. Entity Tags: Aftab Ansari, Saeed Sheikh, India, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh, Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks January 22-25, 2002: India Tells FBI Director About Saeed Sheikh Connection to 9/11 FBI Director Mueller visits India, and is told by Indian investigators that Saeed Sheikh sent ransom money to hijacker Mohamed Atta in the US. In the next few days, Saeed is publicly blamed for his role with gangster Aftab Ansari in financing Atta and organizing the Calcutta attack (see January 22, 2002). TRUST OF INDIA, 1/22/2002; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1/23/2002; INDEPENDENT, 1/24/2002; AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 1/27/2002; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 1/27/2002 Meanwhile, on January 23, Saeed helps kidnap reporter Daniel Pearl and is later arrested. Also on January 23, Ansari is placed under surveillance after flying to Dubai, United Arab Emirates. On January 24, Mueller and US Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlin discuss Saeed at a previously scheduled meeting with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Apparently Saeed’s role in Pearl’s kidnapping is not yet known. PRESS, 2/24/2002 On Mueller’s way back to the US he flies to Dubai to pressure the government there to arrest Ansari and deport him to India. Ansari is arrested on February 5 and deported four days later. PRESS, 2/10/2002; FRONTLINE (CHENNAI), 2/16/2002; INDIA TODAY, 2/25/2002 Entity Tags: Robert S. Mueller III, India, Saeed Sheikh, Daniel Pearl, Wendy Chamberlin, Aftab Ansari, Pervez Musharraf, Mohamed Atta Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh January 23, 2002: Bin Al-Shibh’s Failed Effort to Get Passport Indicates Al-Qaeda and Ansar Al-Islam Are Not Cooperating Ramzi bin al-Shibh attempts to obtain a false passport, but fails to do so as he cannot afford one and a group controlled by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi refuses to pay for him. Bin al-Shibh, already known as a key 9/11 plotter at this time, presumably desires the passport so he can make a trip outside Pakistan, where he will be interviewed in April (see April, June, or August 2002). He tries to obtain it from the terrorist organization Ansar al-Islam, which is associated with al-Zarqawi. In a conversation monitored by the police, Ansar operatives discuss using money from fake ID operations to pay for bin al-Shibh, but decide not to do so as, according to the Wall Street Journal, “Mr. Zarqawi… had allocated all the available profits to pay for passports for his own fighters,” and bin al-Shibh “isn’t part of the al Tawhid group associated with Ansar and al-Zarqawi structure, and has no position in the hierarchy.” STREET JOURNAL, 4/14/2004 Entity Tags: Al-Tawhid, Ansar al-Islam, Al-Qaeda, Ramzi bin al-Shibh Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany, Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links January 23, 2002: Reporter Daniel Pearl Is Kidnapped While Investigating the ISI Daniel Pearl. Publicity photo Wall Street Journal report Daniel Pearl is kidnapped while investigating the ISI’s connection to Islamic militant groups. 1/25/2002; BBC, 7/5/2002 Saeed Sheikh is later convicted as the mastermind of the kidnap, and though it appears he lured Pearl into being kidnapped beginning January 11, the actual kidnapping is perpetrated by others who remain at large. FAIR, 8/2002; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 1/23/2003 The Guardian later suggests that Pearl must have been under ISI surveillance at the time of his kidnapping. “Any western journalist visiting Pakistan is routinely watched and followed. The notion that Daniel Pearl, setting up contacts with extremist groups, was not being carefully monitored by the Secret Services is unbelievable—and nobody in Pakistan believes it.” 4/5/2002 Both al-Qaeda and the ISI appear to be behind the kidnapping. The overall mastermind behind the kidnapping seems to be Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, also mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. 1/26/2003; CNN, 1/30/2003 Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Saeed Sheikh, Daniel Pearl, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed January 24, 2002: CIA Veteran David Cohen Joins NYPD Michael Sheehan (left), Raymond W. Kelly and David Cohen Alan Chin/New York Times (Feb. 15, 2004) (click image to enlarge) The New York Police Department (NYPD) appoints CIA veteran David Cohen to the newly-created post of deputy commissioner of intelligence. YORK CITY, 1/24/2002 Cohen headed the CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) from 1995 to 1997. After leaving the agency, he joined AIG, the world’s largest insurance company, in November 2000. UNDERWRITER PROPERTY AND CASUALTY, 1/15/2001 He also apparently headed the CIA’s office in New York, which was located in WTC7 before its collapse, at some point. The press release announcing his hiring says that “he also served as the senior CIA official in the New York area,” but provides no additional details. “Asked if he ever worked in the CIA’s office in the World Trade Center, he laughed and said, ‘You’re going to have to ask the CIA where their offices were,’” reports the New York Times. YORK TIMES, 1/25/2002 NYPD also created a new post of deputy commissioner of counterterrorism, which will be filled by Michael Sheehan from 2003 to 2006. Cohen and Sheehan’s appointments are part of a huge expansion of NYPD’s intelligence-gathering and counterterrorism efforts, which will be the subject of numerous press reports. YORK TIMES, 1/15/2004; NEW YORKER, 7/25/2005 Entity Tags: AIG (American International Group, Inc.), David Cohen, Central Intelligence Agency, Michael Sheehan, New York City Police Department Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics January 24, 2002: President Bush and Vice President Cheney Pressure Senator Daschle to Avoid 9/11 Inquiry Vice President Dick Cheney calls Democratic Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle and urges him not to launch a 9/11 inquiry. When the call is made, Howard Fineman of Newsweek is in Daschle’s office and he hears that end of the conversation, providing important independent confirmation of Daschle’s account. Author Philip Shenon will later describe Cheney’s tone as “polite but threatening,” and Cheney reportedly tells Daschle that an investigation into 9/11 would be a “very dangerous and time-consuming diversion for those of us who are on the front lines of our response today.” Cheney also says that if the Democrats push for an investigation, the White House will portray them as undermining the war on terror. Shenon will later call this “a potent political threat” the Republicans are holding over the Democrats. President Bush repeats the request on January 28, and Daschle is repeatedly pressured thereafter. 2/4/2002; SHENON, 2008, PP. 29-30, 426 Cheney will later disagree with this account: “Tom’s wrong. He has, in this case, let’s say a misinterpretation.” 5/27/2002 Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Tom Daschle, Howard Fineman, George W. Bush, Philip Shenon Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: 9/11 Commission January 25, 2002: Suspect Bosnian Charities Not Shut Down It is reported that four charities operating in Bosnia are due to be shut down there within weeks. The four are Saudi High Relief Commission, Global Relief Foundation (GRF), Active Islamic Youth (AIO), and the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA). The Saudi High Commission is closely tied to the Saudi government and has given out hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to Bosnia. At least three suspects recently arrested by the US worked for the Commission, and it had a long history of known militant links (see 1996 and After). In late 2001, GRF was shut down in the US and the UN shut its offices in nearby Kosovo (see December 14, 2001). In the early 1990s, TWRA funneled hundreds of millions of dollars worth of weapons to Bosnia in violation of a UN embargo (see Mid-1991-1996). A Bosnian police official says, “We have information that these groups are used to finance and support terrorism. There is also definitely money laundering here. And this laundering definitely shows evidence of sources in the narcotics and arms trades.” Bosnian Deputy Minister Rasim Kadic says, “A series of searches and other intelligence gathering proved activities and evidence that has no relationship to humanitarian work. Four groups have very suspicious financial dealings and other issues have made police very suspicious about these four groups.… We expect to make the hard decision to close some of these groups. We will say ‘Thank you for your help, but now you must go.’” Officials say have also discovered evidence of drug and weapons trafficking by the four charities. PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 1/25/2002 But in fact, the four charities are not shut down in Bosnia, except for GRF, which will have its offices there shut near the end of 2002. 11/28/2002 In 2004, there will be reports that TWRA is operating in the Czech Republic. 3/15/2004 And in 2005, counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna will tell an Austrian newspaper that TWRA is still tied to radical militants and still active there. 6/14/2005 Entity Tags: Third World Relief Agency, Rohan Gunaratna, Saudi High Commission, Rasim Kadic, Global Relief Foundation, Active Islamic Youth Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans, Terrorism Financing January 27, 2002: Cheney Says Bin Laden ‘Isn’t That Big a Threat’ Vice President Cheney says, “And we want bin Laden, and I think we will get him, but I’m more concerned about disrupting all of these terrorist cells out there. Bin Laden by himself isn’t that big a threat. Bin Laden connected to this worldwide organization of terror is a threat. We’re going to go after him, but we’re also after the network.” NEWS, 1/27/2002 Entity Tags: Richard (“Dick”) Cheney, Osama bin Laden Category Tags: Afghanistan, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics January 28, 2002: Daniel Pearl’s Kidnappers Make Odd Demands for His Release Reporter Daniel Pearl’s kidnappers e-mail the media a picture of Pearl and a list of very strange demands. 7/5/2002 The kidnappers call themselves “The National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty,” a previously unheard of name. FAIR, 8/2002 Their demands include the return of US-held Pakistani prisoners and the departure of US journalists from Pakistan. NEWS, 2/7/2002 Most unusually, they demand that the US sell F-16 fighters to Pakistan. No militant group had ever shown interest in the F-16’s, but this demand and the others reflect the desires of Pakistan’s military and the ISI to obtain the fighters. TIMES, 4/21/2002; GUARDIAN, 7/16/2002 On January 29, “a senior Pakistani official,” presumably from the ISI, leaks the fact that Pearl is Jewish to the Pakistani press. This may have been an attempt to ensure the kidnappers would want to murder him, which they do shortly thereafter. FAIR, 8/2002 On the same day, it is reported that US intelligence believes the kidnappers are connected to the ISI. PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 1/29/2002 Entity Tags: The National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Daniel Pearl Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh January 29, 2002: Bush Labels Iraq, Iran, and North Korea an ‘Axis of Evil,’ Ending Cooperation with Iran President Bush’s State of the Union speech describes an “axis of evil” consisting of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Osama bin Laden is not mentioned in the speech. PRESIDENT, 2/4/2002 Bush says: “States like these and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.” Bush goes on to suggest for the first time that the US might be prepared to launch pre-emptive wars by saying, “The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.” FAIR, 5/2004 When Bush advisor Richard Perle was asked one month before 9/11 about new challenges the US faced, he replied by naming these exact three countries (see August 6, 2001). Michael Gerson, head of the White House speechwriting team at the time, will later claim that, as Newsweek will later put it, “Bush was already making plans to topple Saddam Hussein, but he wasn’t ready to say so.” Iran and North Korea are inserted into the speech in order to avoid focusing solely on Iraq. The speech is followed by a new public focus on Iraq and a downplaying of bin Laden (see September 15, 2001-April 6, 2002). Prior to the speech, the Iranian government had been very helpful in the US fight against the Taliban, since the Taliban and Iran were enemies. 2/12/2007 At the time, al-Qaeda operatives had been streaming into Iran from Afghanistan following the defeat of the Taliban. Iran has been turning over hundreds of suspects to US allies and providing US intelligence with the names, photographs, and fingerprints of those it is holding. POST, 2/10/2007 Newsweek will later say that it is “beyond doubt” the Iranian government was “critical… to stabilizing Afghanistan after the fall of Kabul.” But all this cooperation comes to an end after the speech. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Hossein Adeli will later say that “Those the Iranian government who were in favor of a rapprochement with the United States were marginalized. The speech somehow exonerated those who had always doubted America’s intentions.” 2/12/2007 In August 2003, reporter Jeffrey St. Clair will write that “the Axis of Evil not an ‘axis’ at all, since two of the states, Iran and Iraq, hate… each other, and neither have anything at all to do with the third, North Korea.” 8/13/2003 Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Mohammad Hossein Adeli, Jeffrey St. Clair, Michael Gerson Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, US International Relations Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics January 31, 2002: Reporter Daniel Pearl Is Murdered by Pakistani Kidnappers Reporter Daniel Pearl moments before he is killed. Associated Press Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl is murdered. He is reported dead on February 21; his mutilated body is found months later. Police investigators say “there were at least eight to ten people present on the murder scene” and at least 15 who participated in his kidnapping and murder. “Despite issuing a series of political demands shortly after Pearl’s abduction four weeks ago, it now seems clear that the kidnappers planned to kill Pearl all along.” POST, 2/23/2002 Some captured participants later claim 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is the one who cuts Pearl’s throat. 9/17/2002; TIME, 1/26/2003 The land on which Pearl was held and murdered reportedly belongs to either the Al Rashid Trust, or one of its supporters, Saud Memon. The Al Rashid Trust, an ostensibly charitable organization that US intelligence linked to the financing of al-Qeada, is closely linked to the jihadi organization Jaish-i-Mohammed and was one of the very first organizations to have its assets frozen after 9/11. It may have been used to funnel money to the 9/11 hijackers in the US (see Early August 2001 and September 24, 2001). 1/26/2003; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 5/9/2004; TRIBUNE, 4/2/2006 Entity Tags: Al Rashid Trust, Daniel Pearl, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Saud Memon Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh, Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed January 31, 2002: CNN Broadcasts Video of Previously Secret Bin Laden Interview CNN broadcasts an interview of Osama bin Laden conducted by Al Jazeera reporter Tayseer Allouni. The interview was recorded in October 2001 (see October 20, 2001). 2/5/2002; MILES, 2005, PP. 176-177 Al Jazeera had decided not to broadcast the interview because al-Qaeda operatives intimidated Allouni, he was not allowed to ask his own questions, and the station thought the resulting product was just propaganda for bin Laden. However, Western intelligence agencies obtained the tape (see Before November 11, 2001), and news of it leaked to the media. CNN then obtained a copy and now broadcasts it, thinking this a media coup. For example, CNN executive Eason Jordan says the video is “extremely newsworthy… it not only absolutely warrants being seen, it must be seen.” It is unclear where CNN got the tape from. Author Hugh Miles will suggest that the network acquired the tape with the blessing of the US government. He will point out that National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice recently instructed news outlets not to air bin Laden messages, apparently for fear they may contain hidden signals. However, CNN is not rebuked for running excerpts from the tape. Miles will also point out that Al Jazeera’s refusal to broadcast the tape is used to attack the station in the US media, as it is “widely insinuated that the affair had been an attempt by Al Jazeera to cover up bin Laden’s confession of responsibility for 9/11.” However, in retrospect, Miles will say it is a “smear campaign by the coalition, bitter at Al Jazeera’s coverage of the war and desperate to have bin Laden’s near-confession on air, to prove their vengeful war was justified.” 2005, PP. 177-182 Entity Tags: Hugh Miles, Osama bin Laden, CNN, Eason Jordan Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11 (Early 2002): FBI Whistleblower Threatened with Investigation At some point during Sibel Edmonds’ effort to report her concerns about potentially major security breaches in the FBI’s translation department (see, e.g., December 2, 2001), she is told by a superior in the counterintelligence squad: “I’ll bet you’ve never worked in government before. We do things differently. We don’t name names, and we usually sweep the dirt under the carpet.” YORK OBSERVER, 1/22/2004 On another occasion, an assistant special agent allegedly tells her: “Do you realize what you are saying here in your allegations? Are you telling me that our security people are not doing their jobs? Is that what you’re telling me? If you insist on this investigation, I’ll make sure in no time it will turn around and become an investigation about you.” NEWS, 10/25/2002 Entity Tags: Sibel Edmonds Category Tags: Sibel Edmonds